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Abstract
Water rights transfers for surface water have taken place in El Paso County in far west Texas for many decades.
Historically, these exchanges have primarily occurred between agricultural water users. In recent decades, there
have also been transfers from agricultural uses to urban uses. Ongoing commercial and demographic expansion in
the El Paso metropolitan economy increases the likelihood of additional farm-to-municipal transfers in future
years. Although legal mechanisms have periodically been introduced to allow these exchanges to occur, pricing
has not played a central role in the process. At present, transfers of surface water rights in El Paso County occur
under fairly rigid conditions.
Keywords: Regional economic growth; Surface water rights transfers
Introduction
El Paso County is located a semi-arid region of far west Texas. Because it typically receives slightly
less than 230 mm of rain per year, agriculture in El Paso has always depended upon a combination of
surface and ground waters to be viable. Over time, a system of water rights was established for
agricultural users. That system allows surface water rights to be transferred among different farm
producers, although a functional market in which multiple transfers occur at negotiated prices for this
category of user rights does not currently exist.
In recent decades, the category of water transfers receiving the most attention has been that involving
agriculture-to-municipal transfers of existing surface water rights. These transfers are sometimes
accompanied by controversy. They currently involve water-use exchanges within the county, but may
eventually evolve to include regional transfers of groundwater from other parts of Texas (Phillips &
Herna´ndez, 1998). Regional transfers from across state lines with southern New Mexico could
potentially occur at some point in the future (Earl & Czerniak, 1996). Transfers across the international
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boundary with northern Mexico may also eventually occur. Regional water transfers across state and
international borders would involve complicated negotiations, but could also allow the capture of
potential economies of scale that may enable them to be successfully completed one day. Given the
nature of jurisdictional concerns involving water, such a scenario is not likely in the short-term.
The material below summarizes the current state of water transfers among users and uses of the United
States Bureau of Reclamation Rio Grande Project surface water in El Paso County, Texas. Specific
topics covered include historical background, recent economic trends and future steps. As shown by the
protracted snow drought of the early 2000 s at the headwaters of the Rio Grande, numerous factors can
affect the availability of river water in El Paso. Greater flexibility in the management of existing rights to
the water that does flow through the region each year may help stakeholders maximize their respective
welfare. In addition to the different topics related to surface water rights transfers, a brief review of
ground water rights transfers in Texas and how they might eventually be utilized in El Paso County is
also included.
Historical background
Historically, nearly all of the Rio Grande surface water released by the United States Bureau of
Reclamation every year from Caballo Dam and Elephant Butte Dam in Southern New Mexico was
utilized for agricultural purposes. Under the 1906 Convention for the Equitable Division of the Waters of
the Rio Grande for Irrigation Purposes, 74 million m3 per year are diverted to Mexico during normal
years. Drought provisions allow for less than that amount to be diverted to Mexico during years in which
the Bureau of Reclamation is forced to release smaller volumes from the New Mexico dams (Eaton &
Hurlbut, 1992). Such instances have occurred on multiple occasions during the mid-1950 s, the mid-
1960 s, the early and late 1970 s and, most recently, in 2003. The map in Fig. 1 displays the geographic
location of both reservoirs.
On the north side of the border, surface water diversions are measured in acre-feet. One acre-foot
contains 43,560 cubic feet. The latter figure corresponds to approximately 1,233.5 m3. Alternatively, an
acre-foot also contains 325,851 gallons. That volume is sufficient to provide a family of four persons
with enough water to last approximately two years (TRNCC, 2002). El Paso County Water Improvement
District 1 is the organization that delivers surface water from the Rio Grande to agricultural users within
El Paso County. It also collects water rights taxes to manage the canal system that delivers the water.
There are 69,010 acres of irrigable water rights land located within its boundaries. During normal years,
El Paso County Water Improvement District 1 has generally received 376,860 acre-feet of water from
the reservoirs in New Mexico. As occurred in 2003, droughts that affect the headwaters of the Rio
Grande can lead the United States Bureau of Reclamation to release substantially less than that amount
of water. Table 1 lists a subset of the various regional agencies that are involved in water distribution
policy decisions in the region surrounding El Paso. The approximate geographic locations and
boundaries of these organizations are also shown in Fig. 1.
In April 2003, 35,974 separate accounts held agricultural water rights managed by El Paso County
Water Improvement District 1. Water allocated to all of those users is distributed through an extensive
canal system. District 1 data for April 2003 indicate that a wide variety of crops are irrigated using river
water. They include alfalfa, Pima cotton, pecan trees, pasture grass, onions, wheat, Upland cotton, yard
grass, peppers and Sudan grass. As shown in Fig. 1, the District boundaries stretch along the portions of
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El Paso County that lie next to the river. Owing to economic expansion and urbanization, a large portion
of the district boundaries and the canal network lie within the El Paso City limits and the El Paso Public
Service Board Service Area. The Public Service Board oversees El Paso Water Utilities, the municipal
water authority for the city.
Fig. 1. El Paso regional water district boundaries.
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In 1900, there were only 24,886 people residing in El Paso County and sufficient surface water was
available for agricultural use. Sufficient groundwater was also available for municipal use. Demographic
expansion in subsequent years was fairly rapid in El Paso and other western cities. Increasing
urbanization eventually led policymakers to contract some surface water to be transferred from
agricultural use to urban use (Michelsen & Wood, 2003). Municipal uses are commonly defined as
residential, commercial, industrial, public sector and other uses that are part of an urban water authority
delivery system. The 1920 Act for the Sale of Project Water for Miscellaneous Purposes allowed the City
of El Paso to acquire surface water as a means of reducing dependency on the Mesilla and Hueco
aquifers (Cortez, 2003).
In order for the United States Secretary of the Interior to approve contracts under the 1920 Act for the
sale of water for municipal and industrial uses other than irrigation, several conditions must be satisfied
(Cortez, 2001). They include prior approval from El Paso County Water Improvement District 1;
documentation that other practicable sources are not available; non-detriment to water service provided
to other water rights holders; and crediting of moneys derived from the contracts to the United States
Bureau of Reclamation fund used to manage the dams in southern New Mexico from which the water is
supplied. Because water levels dropped fairly dramatically in both the Hueco and Mesilla Aquifers after
1900, satisfying the second condition has generally been fairly straightforward to document (Tanski &
Bath, 1995).
The City of El Paso first requested conversion of existing rights under the 1920 Act in 1940. Since
then, there have been a series of contracts negotiated with respect to acquiring and converting irrigation
water to urban uses. On 18 February 1941, a three-party contract was negotiated between the United
States Bureau of Reclamation, El Paso County Water Improvement District 1 and the City of El Paso. It
allowed the City of El Paso to acquire a fee title to up to 2,000 acres of irrigable land in El Paso County
and to convert the water allotted to those lands to municipal and industrial uses (Cortez, 2001). The
agriculture-to-urban transfers permitted by the 1941 contract are capped at 3.5 feet of water per acre, or a
maximum of 7,000 acre-feet per year. Under the 1941 contract, the City of El Paso was required to pay to
the district the same annual fees and assessments as charged to agricultural users: US$15 per acre-foot.
On 1 December 1944, a three-party contract between United States Bureau of Reclamation, the
Elephant Butte Irrigation District and the City of El Paso similarly allowed municipal purchases of up to
2,000 acres of Rio Grande Project irrigated land and conversion of the appurtenant water supplies to
urban uses. The 1944 contract initially seemed to be a harbinger of relatively seamless future transfers in
Table 1. El Paso region water distribution organizations.
Organization Charter
United States Department of the Interior, Bureau of Reclamation Federal agency
New Mexico Office of the State Engineer State agency
International Boundary and Water Commission, United States Federal Agency
Elephant Butte Irrigation District Farm producers agency
El Paso County Water Improvement District Number 1 State agency
El Paso Water Utilities Municipal utility
Junta Municipal de Agua y Saneamiento de Ciudad Jua´rez Municipal utility
Comisio´n Internacional de Lı´mites y Agua, Me´xico Federal agency
Comisio´n Nacional del Agua, Me´xico Federal agency
Distrito de Riego 009, Valle de Jua´rez Federal agency
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response to eventual urban growth in El Paso. To date, however, the City of El Paso has not been able to
take delivery of any surface water pursuant to this contract owing to legal issues that have arisen in New
Mexico. Legislative barriers were adopted in Santa Fe in 1953 that made “exports” of water from New
Mexico to other states such as Texas illegal (Clark, 1987). A series of legal actions during the 1980s
eventually resulted in a joint agreement that calls for other steps such as building a lined canal from
Caballo Dam to reduce transmission losses before additional water can be brought across the state
boundary (Earl & Czerniak, 1996).
Water rights leasing was authorized under the 20 December 1962 three-party contract negotiated
between the United States Bureau of Reclamation, El Paso County Water Improvement District 1 and
the City of El Paso. The 1962 contract allows owners of tracts of irrigated land to lease their water rights
to the City of El Paso (Cortez, 2001). The tracts from which the water rights are leased must lie within
the city limits and also within the improvement district boundaries. Land tracts that fall outside those
boundaries and/or that exceed a 2-acre size limit, can still lease their water rights to the city if approved
by the improvement district board of directors. Review of those applications is done on a case-by-case
basis.
Water rights leases signed under the 1962 contract must be for a minimum of 25 years. Compensation
to be paid by the city to the landowners was not specified in the contract. The city was required to pay the
district’s annual taxes and assessments for the leased water rights on behalf of the landowners. Leases
signed under the 1962 contract can be renewed for additional 25-year periods unless El Paso Water
Utilities is notified in writing that the landowners elect not to do so. The current lease term is 75 years.
Improvement district and water utility data banks indicate that approximately 5,390 acres of water rights
are currently leased from 14,706 separate accounts under the 1962 contract.
Rapid growth of unincorporated, low-income “colonia” neighborhoods led to the establishment of the
400-square-mile Lower Valley Water District in 1983. The 29 November 1988 three-party contract
between United States Bureau of Reclamation, El Paso County Water Improvement District 1 and the
Lower Valley Water District allows owners of tracts of irrigated land to lease their rights to water to
the Lower Valley Water District. The financial aspects of the 1988 contract were the same as those of the
1962 contract with the city. As with the earlier contract, the lease prices do not anticipate changes in
response to variant economic conditions. Similar to the situation within the El Paso Water Utility service
area, the southeastern portion of El Paso County Water Improvement District 1 overlaps with the Lower
Valley Water District.
A major institutional change was introduced by a series of three water conversion contracts executed
in 1998 and 1999. In compliance with the National Environmental Policy Act, the price per acre-foot for
water transferred from agricultural uses to municipal and industrial uses must be market driven (Cortez,
2001). Such a policy represents an important advance that is internationally not very common, in spite of
the solid logic that underlies it (Anonymous, 2003). Eventually, that step should help ensure that the
surface water that El Paso County Water Improvement District 1 receives from the New Mexico
reservoirs is used efficiently (Michelsen, 1994).
More recently, an agreement was reached between the City of El Paso and El Paso County
Water Improvement District 1 regarding a forbearance framework to allow farmers to sell up to
85% of the irrigation water available to them to the city (Meritz, 2004). Water rights forbearance
allows a municipal water utility to negotiate with landowners for permission to use surface water
rights for a specified period of time. Although still subject to approval by the United States Bureau
of Reclamation, the new agreement brings El Paso County one step closer to a system under which
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a broader and more frequent, set of exchanges can occur than what has previously occurred.
Further improving overall flexibility, the 2004 agreement also allows surface rights transfers from
tracts of land that cover more than 2 acres.
District 1 irrigation water that is converted from agriculture to miscellaneous purposes can come
from several sources (Cortez, 2001). One is from land that will no longer be irrigated owing to
changes in use, such as withdrawal from production for commercial development. A second source
may be from land where the owner will not use all of the water available for irrigation and is
willing to supply a portion of it to a third party. Production shifts to crops that require less water
occasionally lead to this circumstance. A third source may be from improvements in efficiency,
recovery or conservation in the district’s water delivery system. A primary example of the latter is
the additional water that becomes available after canals are lined to reduce seepage losses. Recent
estimates indicate that annual savings from ten miles of canal lining could provide enough water
for 8,000 households (Sheng & King, 2003).
Several important administrative steps must also be taken to convert the Rio Grande Project irrigation
water to urban uses under the 1920 Act (Cortez, 2001). A meeting must first be conducted between
representatives from the United States Bureau of Reclamation El Paso Field Office, El Paso County
Water Improvement District 1 and the third party contractor wishing to transfer the water supply to one
of the various miscellaneous uses other than agriculture. The third party contractor will generally be a
utility, such as El Paso Water Utility or the Lower Valley Water District, but may also be a separate
body, such as an environmental protection organization. Next, a master conversion contract must be
drawn up between the Reclamation El Paso Field Office, Improvement District 1 and the third party
contractor.
Subsequent to that step, a three-party Third Party Implementing Contract is executed between the
Reclamation El Paso Field Office, Improvement District 1 and the third party contractor. The
implementing contract, among other things, authorizes the conversion in use and identifies the specific
source, or sources, of the surface water. Finally, any contract involving a conversion of water to
municipal and industrial uses that is executed by a landowner, water resource entity and Improvement
District 1, must be reviewed and approved by the United States Bureau of Reclamation (Cortez, 2001).
In addition to these procedural steps, pricing, subject to existing agreements governing earlier
exchanges, will be market-driven. A federal fee of US$5 per acre-foot or 5% of the purchase price must
also be paid to the United States Bureau of Reclamation. Federal administrative costs must also be
covered by the water resource entity. The 2004 agreement between the city and the district should help
ensure that this process is executed in a fairly smooth manner (Meritz, 2004).
Recent and current economic trends
Numerous steps remain to be taken with respect to establishing a final framework that allows more
flexible agriculture-to-metropolitan water transfers in El Paso County. There are, however, a variety of
factors that make eventual attainment of such a system likely. Two basic price sets determine the
attractiveness of leasing water from agriculture to other uses, crop prices and water prices (Gardner &
Miller, 1983; Gardner & Young, 1984). In recent years, the value of El Paso County agricultural output
has declined (Herendeen, 2003). Total farm acreage has also dropped substantially below the peak level
observed in 1954 (Table 2). The latter items, in part, reflect farm prices that have generally increased at
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relatively slow rates and have also been subject to periodic declines in real terms. Given the municipal
and industrial trends reviewed below, there is reason to believe that the prices at which water would have
been converted to other uses in recent years could have trended upwards if a more flexible system for
transfers had existed. One estimate places the 2004 value of an acre-foot at US$200 (Meritz, 2004).
The biggest reason for passage of the 1920 Act for the Sale of Project Water for Miscellaneous
Purposes was anticipated western state population growth. Demographic expansion has continued
subsequent to 1941 when the first irrigation water transfers occurred. Increases in the local population
bases have caused the levels of the Hueco and Mesilla aquifers to decline substantially (Tanski & Bath,
1995). Additional population growth is also forecast on a long-run basis for El Paso, Ciudad Jua´rez and
Las Cruces (Peach, 2000; Fullerton & Tinajero, 2004). Table 3 summarizes historical and projected
population levels for the three urban economies that jointly comprise the borderplex metropolitan area
that straddles three domestic state boundaries and one international border.
It is easy to see that demographic trends probably would translate into upward price movements for
surface water transfers in a more market-oriented context. Those pressures would have been reinforced
by real income growth in the borderplex during this period. Table 4 contains historical and projected real
total and per capita incomes for the El Paso metropolitan economy. Simply put, increases in effective
purchasing power almost always lead to higher prices for scarce commodities such as water whose
supplies are not expanding rapidly, if at all. In recent years, there has been a difference of opinion
between the Improvement District and El Paso Water Utilities over what the price for water rights
transfers should be (EPWU, 2002). Research for other western cities indicates, however, that water
prices in general throughout the region may be lower than advisable and should increase (Brookshire
et al., 2002; MacLeod & Smith, 2003). As more transfers occur, evidence will become available
regarding local market valuation of irrigation water.
Additional pieces of evidence also indicate that a market-based system for water rights transfers
would have led to higher prices. On the different occasions when rates have been established (1941,
1962, 2001) for different categories of agriculture-to-urban transfers in El Paso County, the average
price per acre-foot has increased. An upward trend can also be observed using El Paso Water Utilities
Table 2. El Paso County farm and acreage trends.
Year Farms Acreage
1954 690 589,309
1959 482 518,335
1964 403 513,752
1969 452 445,872
1974 317 386,596
1978 380 333,005
1982 452 299,665
1987 422 236,667
1992 438 245,000
1997 530 249,165
2002 600 113,948
Source: United States Census of Agriculture, various issues. Not all farms in El Paso County are irrigated. The acreage for 1992
is estimated. United States Bureau of Reclamation data for 1954 through 1999 indicate that El Paso County irrigated acreage
oscillated between 45,000 and 61,000 acres each year.
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annual operations data for water and wastewater. As shown in Table 5, per gallon fees have historically,
but not always, more than kept pace with inflation. El Paso Water Utilities recently reaffirmed plans to
raise water rates in real terms in future years (Mrkvicka, 2003a; Wilson, 2003). The latter decision is
important because whenever El Paso Water Utilities, similar to other metropolitan utilities, has raised
rates in the past, per capita consumption has declined across customer classes (Fullerton & Schauer,
2001; Griffin, 2001; Fullerton & Elias, 2004). Among important metropolitan economies in the desert
southwest, El Paso has one of the lowest per capita consumption usage levels (EPWU, 2002). Despite
this, growth in the number of users in each customer class usually prevents total municipal and industrial
water consumption levels from falling in El Paso (Tables 6 and 7).
The above material examines issues involving transfers of rights to use Rio Grande surface water.
Groundwater rights in Texas receive very different legal treatment compared with surface water rights.
While subject to Texas Commission on Environmental Quality groundwater quality restrictions,
groundwater generally belongs to landowners (Fambrough, 2002). Similar to minerals, however,
groundwater rights can also be sold or leased separate from the land under which the water is found.
Although groundwater leasing is legal in Texas, numerous questions have yet to be considered by the
judicial system including those that involve regional transfers from part of the state to another.
Because the price for such geographic transfers is negotiable, it improves the likelihood that “water
imports” from counties such as Hudspeth, Culberson, Jeff Davis and Presidio may one day occur. In
addition to the lease price for the water, however, it is important to recognize that the pipelines required
to transport it would be expensive to build and manage. Investment in such a conveyance system would
be preceded by possibly lengthy discussions with regional conservation districts and state planning
Table 3. Borderplex population trends.
Year El Paso Cd. Jua´rez Las Cruces
1970 360.462 414.908 70.254
1980 483.711 567.365 81.979
1990 595.350 798.499 136.593
2000 681.700 1218.817 175.028
2010 764.439 1567.160 203.826
2020 843.769 1992.740 240.171
Units: 1000 s. Source: Fullerton & Tinajero, 2004 and University of Texas at El Paso Border Region Modeling Project.
Table 4. El Paso real income trends, 1996 US$.
Year Total Per capita
1970 $3,710 million $10,292
1980 $5,559 million $11,491
1990 $8,534 million $14,335
2000 $11,737 million $17,212
2010 $15,057 million $19,508
2020 $17,692 million $21,163
Source: Fullerton & Tinajero, 2004 and University of Texas at El Paso Border Region Modeling Project. Total real income is
reported in millions of 1996 US dollars. Real per capita income is reported in 1996 US dollars. The United States personal
consumption expenditures deflator is used to adjust the data.
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agencies. Beyond leasing land from existing owners, El Paso Water Utilities has also purchased
ranchland at several locations in West Texas in anticipation of eventual importation of groundwater from
those areas (Archuleta, 2003). Progress involving county-to-county groundwater transfers is likely to be
slow and deliberate, but offers an additional source of water for El Paso and other western urban areas
that may eventually be tapped (Crowder, 2003). Concerns regarding regional economic losses resulting
from reductions in agricultural and other activities can potentially be addressed by imposing “transfer
taxes.” Monies from the latter mechanisms can be used to replace anticipated reductions in property tax
revenues and other fiscal lines, thus minimizing adjustment difficulties that may be faced in groundwater
exporting jurisdictions (Gardner, 1990).
Future directions
Ongoing borderplex economic expansion guarantees that the demand for water will continue to grow
in El Paso. A mix of conservation efforts have also been utilized for more than a decade to lower per
capita demands (Schmandt, 2002). In spite of these efforts, limited local groundwater development
options caused by salinity and other problems imply that surface water from the Rio Grande will be
likely to play a central role in supplying future urban water requirements (Flynn, 2003). This requires
transfer of water rights from agriculture to other uses, as has occurred in other regions of the western
United States (Randall, 1981; Weatherford & Shupe, 1986). Under normal spring run-off conditions,
approximately 376,860 acre-feet of surface water per year can be diverted from the river to District 1
agricultural users in El Paso County.
Table 5. El Paso water utility average per gallon water charges.
Year Nominal US$ Real 1996 US$
1980 0.75 1.35
1985 1.27 1.78
1990 1.50 1.75
1995 1.98 2.02
2000 2.32 2.16
Source: Water and wastewater gallon and revenue data used in the calculations are from El Paso Water Utilities. The United
States personal consumption expenditures deflator is used to adjust the data.
Table 6. El Paso water utility meters in service.
Year SF-residential MF-residential Commercial Industrial Other
1970 59.417 4.247 5.161 0.136 1.899
1980 88.697 4.742 6.609 0.096 1.657
1990 110.692 4.918 7.746 0.140 5.538
2000 133.879 4.758 8.828 0.207 16.277
2010 157.578 4.879 9.597 0.179 27.776
2020 179.643 4.868 10.872 0.111 40.237
Units: 1000 s. Source: Fullerton & Tinajero, 2004 and University of Texas at El Paso Border Region Modeling Project.
Residential accounts are classified as either single-family (SF) or multi-family (MF).
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There is already a long history of water transfers in El Paso County. Historically, most of the transfers
that have occurred have been between agricultural users. A growing number involve transfers from
agriculture to municipal and industrial uses. The water rights exchanges to date have not been
documented in a manner that allows them to be researched very extensively. Development of a registry
of historical transactions would allow specific characteristics associated with El Paso County to be
investigated, documented and quantified. The 2004 agreement between the City of El Paso and El Paso
County Water Improvement District 1 raises the possibility of relatively flexible exchanges between
agricultural and municipal uses in the foreseeable future. These transactions are expected to occur at
market prices that are negotiated between the different parties involved.
Pressures to transfer water from agricultural uses to metropolitan and/or other uses arise because the
alternative uses place higher value on the water (Michelsen, 1994). Agricultural water rights holders in
El Paso County Water Improvement District 1 may wish to examine the potential gains associated with
competitively priced short-term leases relative to those associated with longer-term leases of their
respective rights. This would require movement in the direction of a more flexible system than currently
exists, but can be accomplished using existing contractual tools and mechanisms if they are more fully
developed. Movement in this direction would potentially allow different parties to achieve economic and
financial gains while reducing the number of legislative and judicial confrontations that have
occasionally flared in the region (Mrkvicka, 2003b).
Establishing a more operational water market will require additional time and analysis. Highly
competitive markets are characterized by large numbers of buyers and sellers. Because the geographic
extent of El Paso County is limited, the City of El Paso would be likely to account for a large percentage
of the transfers that could eventually occur. Given this prospect, it may be in the interest of agricultural
water rights to sign short-term leasing agreements until better information is available regarding price
trends. Wide variations in prices have been observed in markets where few transactions occur and the
number of participants is limited (Colby et al., 1993; Michelsen, 1994). In spite of the uncertainty over
price, the waters of the Rio Grande are largely appropriated and the introduction of market mechanisms
for water transfers makes sense (Gardner, 1985). Metropolitan growth and municipal water pricing
practices in El Paso have helped local parties understand that water prices in general are rising.
Establishment of an active water market would also require a reduction in institutional restrictions and
transaction costs. The 2004 agreement regarding forbearance contracts will potentially go a long way
towards achieving this goal. Although the time frame and administrative fees to be charged for each
transfer to be transacted are still unclear, as experience is gained, the transfer process will probably
Table 7. El Paso municipal and industrial water consumption.
Year SF-residential MF-residential Commercial Industrial Other
1970 13.989 1.576 3.062 0.887 2.898
1980 16.551 2.626 4.967 0.890 3.908
1990 17.546 4.304 6.526 1.275 4.286
2000 20.338 3.699 4.574 0.714 6.697
2010 22.483 3.876 4.462 0.410 10.674
2020 24.981 6.771 5.132 0.260 16.566
Units: Billion gallons. Source: Fullerton & Tinajero, 2004 and University of Texas at El Paso Border Region Modeling Project.
Residential accounts are classified as either single-family (SF) or multi-family (MF).
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become more functional. Among the administrative steps to be taken would be downstream impact
reviews, title searches and application filings. To the extent that it is possible, establishing flat fees and
relatively short time limits for approval decisions would be helpful. The El Paso Public Service Board,
the five-member board of trustees that has oversight with respect to El Paso Water Utilities, has also
recommended removing the requirement that the United States Bureau of Reclamation approve any
contractual transfers that are negotiated (Mrkvicka, 2003b). Improvement District 1 officials have
historically opposed this, but other means for streamlining the process probably exist. Bureau of
Reclamation approval of the 2004 agreement is still pending, but is expected.
An additional market-oriented innovation that might prove helpful during drought years like 2003 is a
system of option contracts for temporary use of irrigation water (Michelsen & Young, 1993). For years
when snowfalls are too light to support normal stream flows and releases from the reservoirs, El Paso
Water Utilities would be able to exercise option contracts to transfer water from agriculture to municipal
uses. The striking price of each option would cover the losses in output values faced by agricultural
operators as a consequence of relinquishing their water allotments when river flows are expected to fall
by a certain percentage below average. Dry year options for temporary leases would have proved helpful
in 2003 when Stage 2 Water Restrictions were enacted by the City of El Paso (Characklis et al. 1999). To
pay for the cost of exercising the options and encourage additional conservation, temporary surcharges
could also be added to water utility bills for the metropolitan customers (Fullerton & Elias, 2004).
Water rights associated with the annual allotments to El Paso County Water Improvement District 1
by the United States Bureau of Reclamation are managed largely in isolation from southern New Mexico
and northern Mexico. Establishment of a better functioning system of transfers can probably be
enhanced by coordinating usage across a wider geographic region than just El Paso County (Earl &
Czerniak, 1996). Allowing El Paso Water Utilities to “import” water from New Mexico and also provide
service to growing cities such as Anthony and Sunland Park would allow those municipalities to take
advantage of the economies of scale available from cooperating on larger production and distribution
volumes. Similarly, it may make sense to set up mechanisms that allow El Paso Water Utilities to assist
the Ciudad Jua´rez Junta Municipal de Agua y Saneamiento with treatment facility plant investments and
other means of preserving and/or extending existing supplies (Gutie´rrez, 2001). Efficient water transfers
and usage markets elsewhere in the western United States have generally involved multiple jurisdictions
and locations (Howe et al., 1986; Michelsen, 1994).
Conclusion
Similar to other regions in the western United States, surface water rights transfers among agricultural
users have occurred in El Paso County for many decades. Readily accessible documentation regarding
those transactions does not currently exist. Federal legislation passed in 1920 provides a general
framework under which United States Bureau of Reclamation Rio Grande Project irrigation water may
also be transferred to miscellaneous uses such as municipal, industrial and environmental uses. The first
contract to allow agriculture-to-urban transfers was approved in 1941.
Continued economic and demographic growth over the course of the last six decades has led to the
development of contracts that permit leasing of rights to use water to the City of El Paso, as well as to the
Lower Valley Water District. Additional contracts have also been designed to allow for the leasing of
rights to use water to occur. Reduced groundwater levels in the Mesilla and Hueco aquifers has increased
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the implied value of the irrigation waters released every year from the Caballo Lake and Elephant Butte
reservoirs. The reduced availability of clean groundwater has also meant that questions about the
transference of irrigation waters from agriculture to municipal and industrial uses have received more
attention in recent years.
The basic institutional mechanisms are in place for a greater number of rights to water transfers to
occur in El Paso County. Agreement between the city and the irrigation district on the forbearance
contract represents an important milestone, but there will probably be additional steps required to reduce
other institutional constraints on water rights transactions. Given the limited number of transactions that
have occurred to date, it is not clear what initial pricing patterns will emerge. Recent events indicate that
realistic price ranges are being considered. Allowing more active trading and negotiations over water
rights to occur in El Paso County should help maximize usage efficiency as well as owner benefits.
Eventually, it may be helpful also to permit water exchanges across state and international boundaries as
a means of capturing economies of scale in distribution networks and treatment facilities.
Several tentative policy implications may be drawn from the El Paso County experience. For regions
where intra-sectoral water rights transfers take place, a public registry can help improve insight to the
factors that motivate those exchanges and the conditions under which they occur. In regions where inter-
sectoral transfers are anticipated, flexible pricing should help facilitate the process. For farm producers,
it will allow them to be compensated for temporarily relinquishing the rights to a critical input. For
municipal utilities, it will help ensure access to water during shortages. In regions where state, provincial
and/or international borders are present; cross-boundary leasing flexibility should be considered.
Regional watersheds frequently defy geopolitical boundaries and efficient utilization of these resources
will be likely to require jurisdictional cooperation between multiple public agencies.
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